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COMMENTARY TO ANNE DIPPEL’S 
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COMMENTARIES ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND THE HUMAN 
CONDITION 
Rebeca Ibáñez Martín
Meertens Institute, KNAW 
Reading the provocation of Anne Dippel (2019) I 
wonder how much of her reflections emanate from 
her experience as a mother or rather as an STS 
scholar. Not to say that one excludes the other, of 
course, but her reflections seem to me to be the result 
of a long concoction of STS readings. However, since I 
have the impression that I have been invited to write 
this commentary because I am too a mother (and a 
feminist STS scholar, mind you) I will first engage with 
a commentary on babies and intelligence. 
Anne Dippel writes a commentary about the limits 
of the metaphor of human intelligence as translated 
or mobilized in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Based on her 
fieldwork with computer scientist and physicist working 
at CERN, she reflects on the limits of the metaphor 
between artificial intelligence and human intelligence 
while holding her newborn. It occurs to her to be a 
far-fetched metaphor. Her baby, in contact with her body 
and under her care learns and grows. They both interact. 
Smile. Smile. Giggle. Giggle. Pull tongue out. Pull tongue 
out. A tiring labor of love and nourishing care. 
When my daughter was around 15 months old, 
someone showed me a YouTube video entitled The 
Still Face Experiment. In the video you see a baby girl 
and her mother interact. They are working together 
and they learn to respond to each other. They interact, 
they are responsive to the world and to each other. The 
mother greets the baby. The baby greets back. They 
are working together and they work to coordinate 
their responses. The baby points her finger to the 
ceiling, the mother follows the finger and looks at the 
ceiling. Then, for the experiment’s sake, the mother 
expression turns blank. The baby, in response, does all 
her tricks to get her mother back. She smiles, points 
to things using her finger, makes noises, moves her 
body violently, screams, and still she doesn’t get the 
reaction of her mother. The baby girl becomes very 
distraught. She needs her mother responsiveness. 
What a lesson about intelligence! The baby, in the 
nourishing, emotional, and safe relationship with the 
mother, thrives. Learns. Becomes a tiny human being. 
Learns how attune herself to the other human being 
she has in front. Develops her intelligence. What is 
intelligence after all? For me this video actually shows 
a crucial part of what intelligence may be –something 
learnt in context, in the emotional interactions with 
others and the environment, a responsive dance of 
coordination, dissonance, and repair. The mother, 
after a while, gets her responsive face back and starts 
to interact again with the baby girl, repairing the brief 
break. The lesson may very well be, in Anne Dippel’s 
text, to try to think harder outside of what seems to 
be a very narrow definition of intelligence embraced 
by AI (modeled mainly on reductionist views of 
human memory and visual cognition). How many 
intelligences, developed in what scientific contexts, 
and for what purposes?  
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Anne Dippel touches upon and laments the 
reductionist vision typically hold by her AI interlocutors 
of intelligence. What is more, she worries, that 
such a reductionist view might have wider political 
implications, including a positivist view of AI progress 
with deep roots in a Darwinist view of humanity. She 
worries that «while computer science is bringing man 
to the centre, natural culture research decenters him» 
(Dippel, 2019: 32) that is, there is a reclamation, she 
detects, in computer science of Man with capita M 
in a quasi-demiurgical power position. Scary indeed. 
When the vision of man in AI relies on a vision of a 
politics of domination and neoliberal positivism, 
Dippel writes, it reproduces relations of domination 
and post-colinialism. That ideological ground is 
disastrous. 
What to do? How to intervene? I keep asking myself. 
Anne Dippel has been doing fieldwork for years in the 
AI environment, probably working together with many 
different researchers, reading essays, getting attuned 
to the epistemological problems faced in AI debates. I 
wonder if she has sent her paper for comments to her 
interlocutors and gotten feedback from them, because 
the picture she makes of them is not a very handsome 
one. The simplistic view of intelligence Dippel accuses 
colleagues in AI of hailing, I wonder, is an anecdote 
of her fieldwork or representative of the wider field? 
Little do I know of the discussions in the field, but my 
colleague Marieke van Erp points out to me that «The 
connection between cognitive processes/learning 
and embodiment has been thoroughly debated and 
investigated by roboticists such as Rodney Brooks for at 
least 30 years» (cf. Brooks, 1990). Maybe there is hope?
She ends her essay asking that humans should «take 
responsibility instead of dreaming of outsourcing to 
a techno-god» (Dippel, 2019: 40). The question is 
more complicated though. How can one intervene, 
how can one assume the responsibility that Dippel 
asks us to assume when in fact the design and 
conceptualization processes of AI technologies are 
closed-off and we are limited to receiving the results 
of those design processes? How to intervene then? 
How is she intervening? This is a long question in STS. 
While in STS there seems to be an increased interest 
in experimental projects of intervention (Zuiderent-
Jerak, 2010), the question might be how to make 
STS useful to the practices it engages with (Bal and 
Mastboom, 2007). I don’t have an answer and after 
reading Dippels text I wish she may have a situated 
answer for the field of AI where she works as an 
anthropologist. 
To finish, I would really like to read a further 
comment elaborating on the issue of human 
exceptionalism in AI. Because indeed, not only 
humans do have intelligence(s), other creatures do 
learn, think, make choices (inspiration can be found 
in the work of Vincianne Despret). And, to add to 
the complexity, humans do have many intelligences 
(memory, for example, is not one). Neuropsychologist 
point out to the many ways to train memory a child 
has. The metaphor sometimes used is that memory is 
not a muscle to be trained, but is formed by a myriad 
of different muscles, thus, many different ways 
for memory acquisition and storage. Fascinating 
complexities worth our attention. 
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